kungfuzu
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Post by kungfuzu on Aug 21, 2019 8:16:11 GMT -8
I earlier tried to find out more info about Montemayor, but even the webpage you linked to didn't give much info. I guess he must be a pretty good computer guy to make the visuals so well. In any case, I hope he puts up his 2nd episode of the Midway campaign soon.
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Brad Nelson
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Post by Brad Nelson on Aug 21, 2019 8:37:59 GMT -8
Yes. I’m sure it’s just a matter of time. Until then, I found this short video about Defeat in Detail to be instructive. |
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Post by timothylane on Aug 21, 2019 8:51:27 GMT -8
There were 2 main problems for the US and Australian forces at Savo Island. One was poor night fighting -- the US practiced gunnery in good weather and daylight in order to be able to judge the results better as a contest between ships, whereas the Japanese practiced night fighting techniques. (One odd consequence is that the Japanese weren't so good in the daytime, as seen most notably in the Battle of the Komandorskis in early 1943.) It took the US a year or so to catch up, although they were helped by the fact that after Savo Island every night action in the Solomons was something of a surprise for the Japanese.
The other reason was overwhelming complacency, which arguably was also the problem at Pearl Harbor. (In reality, Admiral Kimmel was concerned with submarines, and rightly so, but the Japanese carrier aircraft turned out to be a much greater threat. General Short was concerned with sabotage by Japanese on Oahu, which turned out not to be a threat.) At least one American aircraft spotted Mikawa's force coming down the Slot, and a picket destroyer picked them up on radar. But they couldn't believe the Japanese were coming (maybe they just didn't think they could react so fast), so neither reported it. The 2 Southern Force cruisers, Chicago and Canberra, didn't realize they were under attack until 6 minutes after the Japanese launched their Long Lance torpedoes. The 3rd cruiser, Australia, was away because Admiral Crutchley had been called to meet Turner and Fletcher for a discussion. He figured he could get there (and back) more quickly that way, and obviously didn't expect any problems in the meantime.)
Even after that fight (Chicago unsuccessfully chased a Japanese destroyer, and thus survived), Mikawa turned north and hit the northern group of 3 heavy cruisers who still didn't realize what was happening. In all, the Allied cruisers scored 3 hits on the Japanese while losing 4 heavy cruisers. But Mikawa decided that he couldn't hit the transports (still unloading supplies) without facing daylight attacks from Fletcher's still unlocated carriers, so he headed back north. (One of his heavy cruisers was sunk by a US submarine -- the torpedoes didn't always fail -- as they approached Rabaul.)
Ironically, Fletcher's carriers weren't much of a threat because he decided to run off before the Japanese (flying all the way from Rabaul) located them and gave them a going-over. Strangely enough, he was kept in command for at least one more major battle before being deployed to some more suitable role, such as the coast defense of Wyoming or some such. (Morison merely said something about duties better fitted to his abilities.) Turner waited a day for further unloading of supplies before leaving himself (with many of the supplies still on board the fleeing ships).
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Brad Nelson
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עַבְדְּךָ֔ אֶת־ הַתְּשׁוּעָ֥ה הַגְּדֹלָ֖ה הַזֹּ֑את
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Post by Brad Nelson on Aug 21, 2019 9:53:25 GMT -8
That video noted that the Japanese had far superior night-vision binoculars.
Yes, that fits the facts shown in the video.
That was the major decision the video talks about: Come back and destroy the transports or get away to Rabaul under cover of darkness. No commander can be expected to have a long-range view. This Japanese commander scored a major victory and he could get back to base with virtually no losses. Who would pat him on the back for destroying the transports (and thus perhaps turning the tied in the Pacific war) if most of his ships didn’t return?
But the video quotes one guy who said “It would have been worth it to take out the transports even at the loss of the entire force.” But that’s a lot to put on someone in charge of all those ships. As it turns out, as you mentioned, the American carriers were heading away from the area and so the Japs could have easily taken out the transports with little risk.
And that highlights the “fog of war” problem they all faced. But it’s interesting to see the Japanese necessarily adopting the tactics of the Germans. Increasingly, neither could easily fight out in the open with American air superiority either having been achieved or heavily tilted that way.
If not for the human costs, the daring night raid is something to admire.
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Post by timothylane on Aug 21, 2019 10:07:17 GMT -8
As a matter of fact, much the same thing would happen in the Battle off Samar (part of the overall Battle of Leyte Gulf) in late 1944. Admiral Kurita had suffered heavily enough from the submarines Dace and Darter (they took out 3 heavy cruisers) and Halsey's carrier aircraft (they sank the Musashi with 36 bomb and torpedo hits) that he momentarily turned back. Halsey therefore decided he didn't need to worry further about him, and thus failed to guard San Bernardino Strait -- through which Kurita sailed that night. He then hit some US escort flotillas, who eventually drove him off mainly by what damage their bombers could do. (Their few popguns didn't accomplish much.)
Meanwhile, there were all those transports still being unloaded, and poorly defended because the battleships had been sent to Surigao Strait to halt another Japanese attack (which they did, quite decisively). But he didn't know that, and got bluffed into fleeing. By then, it was probably better to risk his fleet (which was increasingly hard to fuel -- the Yamato's final sortie was a suicide mission due to the shortage) if he could smash the logistical base of the landing.
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kungfuzu
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Post by kungfuzu on Aug 21, 2019 11:32:16 GMT -8
Was this the incident in which Nimitz sent the message saying something like, "Where is Halsey, the world wonders?"
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Post by timothylane on Aug 21, 2019 12:15:25 GMT -8
Halsey had organized his battleships into TF 34 under Admiral Willis Lee, and both Nimitz and Kincaid had noticed this (though neither was formally notified). When Kurita hit the escort carriers, both admirals asked where Lee and TF 34 were. Nimitz's message was "Where is TF 34?" The encoder added padding to the front and back, as usual, and the concluding padding happened to be "The world wonders." (Some suspect he had recently read "The Charge of the Light Brigade".) The decoder at Halsey's end noticed this, and even though it was marked as padding he thought it made sense and erroneously added it just in case.
Halsey was most definitely NOT PLEASED by the resultant message.
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